BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 1

Article 4

3-1-1980

Constitutional Law-Civil Procedure-Implied Cause
of Action-Extending Bivens to the Fifth
Amendment-Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Constitutional Law-Civil Procedure-Implied Cause of Action-Extending Bivens to the Fifth Amendment-Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979), 1980 BYU L. Rev. 165 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss1/4

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

CASENOTES
Constitutional Law-CIVIL PROCEDUREIMPLIED
CAUSEOF
ACTION- EXTENDING
BIVENS
TO THE FIFTHAMENDMENT-DUU~S
u. Passman, 442 US. 228 (1979)
Shirley Davis was employed by Congressman Otto Passman
of Louisiana as his deputy administrative assistant from February 1to July 31 of 1974. On July 31, Passman terminated Davis'
employment, stating in a letter to her that although she was
"able, energetic, and a very hard worker . . . it was essential
that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man."'
Davis brought suit against Passman in federal district court,
claiming federal jurisdiction through the federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C.
1331(a)."he
charged that Congressman
Passman's gender-based employment decision discriminated
against her in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Adopting the rationale of Bivens u. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of narcotic^,^ Davis
claimed that a cause of action implied from the due process
clause gave her a right to a damages remedy to compensate for
this violation of her fifth amendment rights.'
The U.S. District Court of Louisiana dismissed the suit, declaring that no private right of action existed directly from the
fifth amendment in the absence of congressional authorization.'
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, two hearings
were held. A panel of the appeals court reversed the district
court's dismissal: but the rehearing en banc upheld the district
court's conclusion that a private right of action could not be implied from the fifth amendment in this situation.? Because a ma1. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 n.3 (1979).
2. 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1976) provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens the Supreme Court implied a cause of action directly from the fourth amendment.
4. Brief for Petitioner a t 7, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
5. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
6. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), reu'd on rehearing en banc, 571
F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
7. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), reu'd, 442 U.S. 228
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jority of the circuit courts of appeal had either implied causes of
action from other provisions of the Constitution, or had indicated a willingness to extend the Bivens doctrine beyond the
fourth amendment: the Supreme Court agreed to review Davis
v. Passman to resolve the question.

A. Gaps in Statutory Authorization for a Damages Remedy
Davis was forced to rely on a cause of action implied from
the fifth amendment to redress her grievance because she had no
statutory grounds for seeking damages relief.e Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641° prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in employment practices,ll but the original enactment
(1979).
8. The First Circuit was the only circuit court of appeals that had failed to extend
the Bivens implication doctrine to constitutional guarantees other than those of the
fourth amendment. See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37,42-44 (1st Cir. 1977) (municipality
vicariously liable under the fourteenth amendment). The remaining circuit courts have
found Bivens-type actions in various constitutional settings or have been sympathetic to
an extension of the Bivens doctrine. See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291,1294 (4th Cir.
1978), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, 48 U.S.L.W. 3077 (U.S. Feb. 13,
1979) (No. 78-1260) (fifth amendment); Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 940 (1979) (Bivens should apply to any constitutional guarantee when appropriate); Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193,196 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth
amendment); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932-33 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), modified, 589 F.2d 335 (1978), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 42
(1979) (fourteenth amendment); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d
928,942 (9th Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds, 566 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1979),
modified on other grounds sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (fifth amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167,
194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (first amendment); Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529
F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (sympathetic to claim under the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Sew., 521 F.2d 1392, 1392 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd on remand, 578 F.2d 164 (1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983
(1978) (first amendment); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931-32
(10th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (Bivens not limited to the fourth amendment); Wounded Knee
Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunctive
relief for sixth amendment violation). See also Comment, Constitutionally Implied
Causes of Action: A Policy of Protection, Expansion, or Restriction?, 30 MERCER
L. REV.
1023, 1027-31 (1979).
9. Davis originally sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and specific
relief in addition to damages. However, Congressman Passman was defeated in the 1976
primary election, 422 U.S. a t 230 n.1, so these other forms of relief were no longer available. Consequently, the suit was narrowed to a request for damages. Id. a t 231 n.4.
10. 42 U.S.C. 33 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
11. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides that "[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such indi-

.
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covered only certain private sector employees and not federal
employees.12 Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 extended coverage of Title VII to most federal enployees,13congressional staff employees not governed by competitive service regulations were left outside its protective
umbrella.14
Davis was unable to base her suit on the federal statute
granting a private cause of action to parties deprived of their
constitutional rights under color of state law,16 since this act
does not extend to constitutional violations committed by federal officials like Congressman Passman. Nor did Davis have a
cause of action under Louisiana law? Even if she had, a state
court would arguably have lacked the authority to award a damages remedy against a federal c~ngressman.'~
Consequently, Davis' only possibility for relief rested on judicial extension of the
Bivens doctrine to the fifth amendment.

B. The Implied Constitutional Cause of Action Doctrine
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for the creation of
implied constitutional causes of action in Bell v. Hood.18 The
district court in Bell had dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction a money damages suit against federal officers who
had allegedly violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. This
was done because the remedy had not been authorized by Congress or the Constitution. In reversing this holding, the Supreme
Court stated that when a deprivation of constitutional rights
vidual's . . . sex."
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, Title VII, 5 701,78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)) ("The term 'employer' . . . does not include (1) the
United States . . . . ").
13. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 8 11, 86 Stat. 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-16
(1976)). This legislation provided that "[alll personnel actions affecting employees . . .
in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having
positions in the competitive service . . . shall be made free from any discrimination
based on . . . sex."
14. Congressional st& employees are not hired under the competitive service, so
they are not protected by Title VII. See 442 US. a t 247 & n.26. The competitive service
is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1976). Congressional st& personnel decisions are governed by 2 U.S.C. § 92 (1976), which provides "[tlhat such persons shall be subject to
removal at any time by such Member [of Congress] . . . with or without cause."
15. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1976).
16. 422 US. a t 245 n.23.
17. Id.
18. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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was alleged, federal jurisdiction was conferred by the federal
question jurisdiction statute, which authorized suits "aris(ing1
under the Constit~tion."'~The defense of the nonavailability of
money damages was based on a failure to state a claim for relief,
an issue that could be raised only after jurisdiction was exercised. As to whether or not relief could be granted to the Bell
plaintiffs, the Court observed in dictum that "where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief."20
The authoritative ruling on the discretionary ability of federal courts to award judicially-authorized damages came twentyfive years later in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics." In Bivens, federal narcotics
agents entered and searched Bivens' apartment without a search
warrant and arrested him without probable cause. The Supreme
Court held that there was a federal cause of action arising directly out of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.22The Court, disclaiming any need for
statutory authorization to award a remedy, fashioned a federal
common law money damages remedy from the implied authority
of the Constitution itself? Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan found "no special factors counselling hesitation [in
granting a remedy] in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."" He emphasized that relegating Bivens to alternative
state law remedies would be inadequate, since the interests protected by those state remedies were not as extensive as, and in
some cases even conflicted with, the interests protected by the
fourth amendment?
Justice Harlan, concurring, also concluded that federal
courts do not need specific congressional permission to create
.~
argued that fedremedies for constitutional ~ i o l a t i o n s Harlan
eral courts had previously used the general jurisdictional grant
of 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a)" as authority to grant equitable relief to
Id. at 682-85. The current version of this statute is at 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1976).
Id. at 684.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See note 2 supra.
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plaintiffs asserting constitutional violations. He could see no logical reason why this power should not also extend to awarding
traditional legal remedies like damages.28
Harlan also required a separate determination that the
"compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted."2e Therefore, judicial consideration of policy factors equal in scope to those examined by a legislative body enacting a statutory remedy was necessary to meet
Harlan's test?* Finally, however, the lack of viable alternatives
to a federal damages remedy for Bivens necessitated a vindication of his fourth amendment rights; for people in Bivens' position it was "damages or n~thing."~'

In 1978 the Fifth Circuit concluded in Davis u. Passrnan
that it should not extend the Bivens logic beyond the narrow
confines of the fourth amendment to the more nebulous causes
of action that could arise from the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.s2 After determining that the remedy in Bivens was
partially derived from federal common law sources and not mandated exclusively by the Constitution, the court applied the Cort
v. Ashm criteria for implying statutory causes of action to the
Davis facts. It concluded that a private right of action was not
so compelling as to "countermand the clearly discernible will of
Congress [by creating] a cause of action where Congress declined
to provide one."s4
-

-

28. 403 US. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 410.
32. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), reu'g Davis v.
Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). See 46 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.137 (1977) for comments on the prior panel decision.
33. 422 US. 66 (1975). The Cort criteria for determining if a private cause of action
should be implied from a statutory scheme of relief are the following:
First . . does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative incnt, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law . .
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?
Id. .t 78.
3'4. 571 F.2d at 800.

.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
with a five to four decision and decreed that the Cort criteria do
not apply to constitutional guarantees. The Court held that Davis, who suffered a deprivation of her due process rights by federal action, had a right to an implied cause of action from the
fifth amendment,l15 with a damages remedy to redress her
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Brennan reasoned
that the "implied" equal protection component of the fifth
amendment gave Davis a right to be protected from gender discrimination by her congressional employer if the discrimination
To Brennan
did not serve "important government obje~tives."~~
"the question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' [was] analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any,
a litigant may be entitled to receive;"38 therefore, he adopted
Justice Harlan's viewpoint in Bivens and separated his consideration of the issues concerning (1)the existence of a cause of action, and (2) the plaintiffs right to judicial relief.

A. Cause of Action
Brennan characterized a "cause of action" as the judicial
determination of whether a plaintiff belonged to a class of potential litigants who could, as a matter of law, enforce certain
rights? He asserted that the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Davis could not judicially enforce her due process rights in a private action failed to recognize that constitutional rights and
statutory rights are derived from different sources. It is essential
to find legislative intent to allow a private cause of action when
statutory rights are involved, since those rights are derived from
congressional action. However, the judicial branch has the primary responsibility of enforcing rights derived directly from the
Constitution; therefore, where constitutional rights are involved,
the Cort legislative intent requirements are not appli~able.'~
Victims of federal discriminatory practices with no practical
means to otherwise secure their constitutional rights must be
able to use the federal courts to protect those interests; other35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

442 U.S. at 244.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 234 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
442 U.S. at 239.
Id. at 239 11.18.
Id. at 241-42.
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wise, their rights would be meaningless." Therefore, Davis had a
right to a federal cause of action to enforce her fifth amendment
rights, even though Congress had not expressly or impliedly authorized a private suit.

B. Appropriateness of the Remedy
Although Davis had a right to a cause of action, Justice
Brennan still found it necessary to examine the appropriateness
of the damages remedy she requested. He believed that the Fifth
Circuit erred in emphasizing congressional failure to provide a
remedy for congressional employees threatened by employment
discrimination. Brennan reasoned that Congress did not intend
to preclude alternative judicial remedies for violation of the constitutional rights of congressional employees by failing to extend
coverage of Title VII to them. He found that the rights of congressional employees to certain remedies for constitutional violations existed before the Civil Rights Act was passed, since these
rights were grounded in the Constitution itself. Therefore, a
statutory scheme that bypassed those employees did not affect
their preexisting constitutional remedies.'$ Finding that manageability and the unavailability of alternative relief made a damages remedy proper," the Court decided that the federal judiciary was justified in extending the Bivens doctrine to imply a
damages remedy under the fifth amendment.
The majority opinion aroused three vigorous dissent^.^'
Chief Justice Burger insisted from a separation of powers viewpoint that congressmen needed complete discretion in employment decisions, since loyal staffs are essential to the performance of their legislative duties; therefore, he concluded, "until
Congress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its
own staffs, judicial power in this area is circ~mscribed."~~
Justice Stewart objected to the Court's decision to bypass
the speech or debate clause4@
immunity issue by remanding it for
41. Id. at 242.
42. Id. at 247.
43. Id. at 245-48.
44. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Powell wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Rehnquist joined all three dissents. Justice Powell and the Chief
Justice joined each other's opinion.
45. 442 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46. U.S. CONST.
art. I, 5 6. "[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
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consideration by the trial court as a factor that might "counsel
hesitation" in granting a remedy. He felt that immunity was "a
preliminary question that may be completely dispositive [of the
case] . . . regardless of the abstract existence of a cause of action or a damages remedy."47
Justice Powell appealed for discretion by federal courts
when implying a cause of action directly from the Constitution.
Among the policy factors that Powell felt the Court had ignored
in exercising that discretion was comity or respect for an equal
~ ~ Congress "took pains to exempt
branch of g ~ v e r n m e n t .Since
itself from the coverage of Title VII,"4s Powell believed that the
Court recklessly disregarded the desire of Congress to preclude
judicial examination of its employment decisions.

Davis is significant in terms of constitutional theory not
only because it extends the Bivens rationale beyond the fourth
amendment context, but also because it explores the reasons for
implying constitutional causes of action." Despite fears that the
Court would restrict the constitutional cause of action theory?l
Davis reinforced Bivens by applying its logic to the due process
clause. Moreover, the Court adopted Justice Harlan's reasoning
in Bivens and clarified some of the gaps in the Bivens logic.
The Fifth Circuit was disturbed by the lack of concrete
guidelines in Bivene2 therefore, the court's opinion in Davis at47. 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Id. a t 254.
50. The Supreme Court allowed the lower federal courts to wrestle with the extension of the Bivens rationale to other constitutional issues during the eight year period
between Biuens and Davis by reserving the question for future consideration. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S.478, 486 n.8 (1978); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1976).
51. Lehman, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS
CONST.L. Q. 531, 603-04
(1977). Surprisingly, the controversy in Davis centered on the appropriate use of the
doctrine of constitutional causes of action and not on the validity of the doctrine. "[Ilt
has been clear . . . that in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution." 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
52. Because the Fifth Circuit felt it could not formulate "acceptable limits on the
right of action Davis would have us imply," the court refused to extend Bivens to a
complaint founded on the fifth amendment "until the Supreme Court answers the open
question of whether any such right should exist." 571 F.2d a t 801. The commentators
have also been disturbed by the lack of guidelines for application of the Bivens doctrine:
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tempted to formulate manageable standards for determining
when implication of a constitutional cause of action is warranted. Although the Supreme Court repudiated the Fifth Circuit's use of the Cort criteria, Davis does not signal a complete
abandonment of all barriers in suits alleging violations of constitutional interests by federal action. Instead, the Court reiterated
the Biuens principle that the implication of a constitutional
cause of action is not obligatory, but lies within the court's discretion. Justice Brennan identified four major hurdles that conceivably could prevent favorable judicial action for a constitutional cause of action suit: jurisdiction, standing, cause of action,
and relief?
Jurisdiction guidelines were established in Bell v. Hood,64
which declared that there was subject matter jurisdiction in
cases alleging constitutional violations, unless the claim "clearly
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial
~n
Davis had "alleged such a personal
and f r i v o l ~ u s . " ~addition,
to ensure sufficient
stake in the outcome of the ~ontroversy"~~
standing to bring her suit in federal court. The controversy in
Davis arose over the cause of action and relief issues. Although
Justice Brennan's attempt to analytically separate these two issues served his immediate purposes, it also introduced a new
source of confusion about the reach of the doctrine of implied
constitutional causes of action.

A. Existence of a Cause of Action
When a constitutional violation is alleged, Davis asserts that
a court must consider whether a right to bring a private suit to
enforce constitutional guarantees stems directly from the Constitution itself, absent congressional authorization. Because she
"[A]lthough [Biuens] provides the federal courts with a potentially powerful tool, there
is very little instruction on how or when it is to be used." Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 HARV.L. REV.1532, 1543 (1972).Also see id. at
1544, which suggests that Bivens might be limited to remedies that have "traditionally
been available in the federal courts for other constitutionally based actions."
53. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. Other obstacles that plaintiffs have encountered with Biuens-type actions are outside the scope of this note. However, they are discussed in Note,
"Damages or Nothing9'-The Efficacy of the Bivens-type Remedy, 64 CORNELLL. REV.
667 (1979).
54. See notes 18-20and accompanying text supra.
55. 327 U.S. at 682-83.
56. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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had no effective alternative means of protection, Davis had a
right to "invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of [her] justiciable constitutional rights."" Davis reinforced the Harlan view in Bivens that the federal question jurisdiction statutew impliedly authorized the judicial branch, not
Congress, to decide which litigants may properly demand the
use of the enforcement mechanism of the courts when constitutional rights are involved."
However, this judicial power is not unlimited. In both Davis
and Bivens the Court emphasized that any alternative state tort
actions were either inadequate or nonexistent. Implying a constitutional cause of action was particularly compelling in both
cases, because without federal judicial intervention the plaintiffs' constitutional rights would be unenforceable. Where an action under state law or other appropriate means of protection
are available to preserve an aggrieved party's interests, federal
courts would be less justified in implying a right to bring suit.

B. Appropriateness of the Remedy
The issue most carefully scrutinized in both Davis and Bivens was the appropriateness of the remedy fashioned by the
Court. In Bivens, Justice Brennan outlined three areas of concern: (1) whether the circumstances involved in the case would
make awarding damages appr~priate;'~(2) whether there were
any "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congre~s;"~~
and (3) whether there was an
"explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of [constitutional guarantees] may not recover money damages . . . , but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of C~ngress."'~
Brennan explained in Davis that "[a]lthough [Davis] has a cause
of action, her complaint might nevertheless be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) unless it can be determined that judicial relief is
a~ailable."'~Under Brennan's analysis, if a damages remedy had
57. Id. at 242.
58. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
59. Compare 442 U.S. at 242-45 with 403 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Dellinger, supra note 52, at 1542-43.
60. 403 U.S. at 395-96.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id. at 397.
63. 442 U.S. at 244.
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not been a proper form of relief, a dismissal for "failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be grantedwe4would have been in
order, even though a cause of action existed.
I.

General appropriateness of the circumstances

In Davis, Justice Brennan justified the propriety of authorizing a damages remedy by listing the factors supporting the
grant of that remedy. These factors were: (1)the historic use of
damages as the "ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,"65 (2) the judicial manageability of awarding
damages when there were no "difficult questions of valuation or
causation,"66 due to the extensive experience of federal courts
with similar Title VII damages awards, and (3) the lack of equitable relief or other alternative remedies for Davis?'
By analyzing these factors, Brennan implicitly abandoned
his sweeping generalization in Bivens that as long as a constitutional cause of action could be implied, it was logical for a court
to "use any available remedy to make good the wrong done'w8in
order to protect federally-guaranteed rights. Instead, Brennan
followed the Harlan position in Bivens that an extensive analysis
of policy considerations was required before a judicially-authorized remedy could be created.
Justice Harlan had claimed that "the range of policy considerations [the Court] may take into account is at least as broad as
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy."e9
Among the factors considered by Harlan were the qualifications
of the federal courts to deal with the questions raised by the
constitutional claim,1° the limitations on state damages remedies, the desirability of assessing damages claims against federal
64. FED.R. CIV.P. 12(b)(6).
65. 442 U.S. a t 245 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. a t 395).
66. 442 U.S. a t 245.
67. Id.
68. 403 U.S. a t 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
69. 403 U.S. a t 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 408-09. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978). In Butz,
Justice White addressed the Bivens problem in dictum and admonished that "[albsent
congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully about
whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages
. . . and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the
plaintiffs claim" (citations omitted).
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officials according to uniform federal standards, and the pressures on judicial branch resources from an overburdened
caseload.?l
A question left unanswered by Davis is whether it is appropriate to imply a cause of action to protect all constitutional interests. The Court's analysis in Davis suggests that even if the
nature of the constitutional guarantee being asserted gives rise
to a cause of action, appropriateness problems could result in
the denial of a remedy for that guarantee. Consequently, the implication of constitutional causes of action by lower federal
courts under the first," sixth,?=eighth,?' thirteenth,l%d fourteenth amendments76will be validated only when the requested
remedy is warranted under the Davis criteria.
Davis, therefore, a r m s Harlan's suggestion that, in the absence of congressional authority, federal courts weigh the relevant policy issues before granting relief under an implied cause
of action. Implication of a cause of action in the context of one
constitutional guarantee does not necessarily justify the implication of a cause of action in the context of another.77The breadth
of the judiciary's discretion and the proper time for its invocation are still in question.78
71. 403 U.S. at 410. (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 916 (1978); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862,869-70 (3d Cir. 1975); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Sew., 521 F.2d 1392,1392 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'don remand, 578
F.2d 164 (1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Wounded Knee Legal DefenseIOffense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281,
1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunctive relief for sixth amendment violation).
74. See, e.g., Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 739-40 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
75. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (sympathetic to claim
under the thirteenth amendment).
76. See, e.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977).
77. See 403 U.S. a t 409 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. The commentators have suggested other approaches in determining the appropriateness of a requested remedy. Professor Dellinger has suggested that
[a]s a prerequisite to supplying a remedy, the court must first determine that
the implicated constitutional provision provides substantive protection to one
in the position of the plaintiff. The focus should then be upon whether there
are other remedies available to those in the plaintiffs position that would as
fully effectuate the purpose of the constitutional guarantee as the remedy
sought.
Dellinger, supra note 52, at 1551. Other suggestions include use of the traditional "legislatively defined standards of conduct" to guide the courts in determining if a particular
alleged tort will be recognized. Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counselling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REV. 441, 445 (1976), [hereinafter cited as
Remedies].
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2. Special factors counselling hesitation

Justice Brennan boldly proceeded to fashion a damages
remedy in Bivens because there were "no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Cong e ~ ~ . "Brennan
'~
faced a different situation in Dauis: the scope
of speech or debate clause immunity in a suit against a congressman was clearly a "special factor" counselling hesitation. Brennan disposed of this dilemma by acknowledging the existence of
this special factor, and by then concluding that it had no relevance to the Court's authority to allow Davis to bring a private
The special factors would
suit against Congressman Pas~rnan.~O
only counsel hesitation in granting a remedy, not hesitation in
the implication of a constitutional cause of action. There being a
cause of action, the scope of the immunity for Congressman
Passman was therefore to be determined by the trial court on
remand, since that was the appropriate forum for granting a
remedy.s1
The Court refused to infer that Congress intended to deny
Davis a remedy by failing to extend Title VII protections to congressional employees, since there had been "no explicit congresof legislative intent. The majority rejected
sional de~laration"~~
vague inferences from congressional inaction as a special factor.
These special factors must be objective considerations capable of
careful evaluation by a federal court, they warned, not convenient excuses for denying a plaintiff relief.
In Dauis, Justice Brennan has not exhausted the special factors that conceivably would counsel hesitation in formulating
damages remedies in constitutional cause of action cases.88However, his decision to limit the review of special factors to the
remedy stage hampers the proper consideration of these factors,
79. 403 U.S. at 396. Special factors that had deterred the Court from implying a
federal common law remedy in prior cases were not present in Bivens. Those cases involved: (1) the United States as the plaintiff in a tort action with no specific statutory
grounds for relief, and (2) attempts to impose liability on congressional employees who
had exceeded their congressional authority without violating a constitutional prohibition.
Id.
80. 442 U.S. a t 235 n.11, 246.
81. Id. at 235 n.11.
82. Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. a t 397) (emphasis in Dauis).
83. See Remedies, supra note 78, a t 461-62, for suggestions that "[p]rovisions of the
Constitution itself" and "specific grants of legislative powers" might counsel hesitation
in awarding a remedy to a plaintiff.
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since many of the potential special factors are directly related to
the issue of whether the plaintiff should have the right to be in
court with a cause of action. Such factors as the advisability of
vicarious liability for municipalities,B4the feasibility of using the
procedural guidelines developed in section 1983 suits to determine whether related constitutional causes of action should be
allowed,Bs and the extent to which the courts will allow a plaintiff to use a Bivens-type action to circumvent the procedural difficulties that attend available statutory causes of actions6 will
call for continued judicial balancing of the merits of implying
both a right to judicial action and a right to a particular remedy.
It is difficult to see how the Court can justifiably limit the application of "special factors counselling hesitation" to the remedy
issue only.
3. Remittance to an equally effective remedy

Davis implicitly criticizes Congress' less than exemplary employment record and its failure to extend Title VII or other employment protections to its own employee^.^' Davis produced
"the anomalous result of granting federal employees in noncompetitive positions, whom Congress did not intend to protect, a
remedy far more extensive than Congress adopted for federal
employees in the competitive service, whom it did intend to prot e ~ t . "If~Davis
~
had been covered by Title VII, she would have
been limited under the principles of Brown u. General Services
84. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
904 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42-44 (1st Cir. 1977); Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d
334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976).
85. The Seventh Circuit noted that "because actions brought under the Civil Rights
Acts and those of the Biuens-type are conceptually identical and further the same policies, courts have frequently looked to the Civil Rights Acts and their decisional gloss for
guidance in filling the gaps left open in Biuens-type actions." The Court therefore decided to apply the fj 1983 standards for survivorship of a federal claim after the death of
a federal prisoner in a Biuens-type case. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 940 (1979).
86. Professor Dellinger noted that "[tlhe Bivens decision leads to the rather striking
conclusion that section 1983 may simply be unnecessary: money damages, as well as equitable relief, may be obtained in suits founded directly upon the Constitution." Dellinger, supra note 52, at 1559.
87. 442 U.S. at 247. See also Comment, The Last Plantation: Will Employment
Reform Come to Capitol Hill?, 28 CATH.U.L. REV.271 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Last
Fall 1978, at 46; Isbell,
Plantation); North, Congress: The Last Plantation, BARRISTER,
Congress as 01' Massa, CIV. LIB. REV.,Jan./Feb. 1978, at 46.
88. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d at 798.
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Administrations9 to the exclusive administrative remedies authorized by the Civil Rights Act. Consequently, she would have
been restricted to bringing suit against her former employer in
his official capacity if she was dissatisfied with her administrative rernedies?O
In Bivens, the Court began making policy judgments on the
availability of judicial relief for plaintiffs alleging constitutional
violations. Although the dissenters in Bivens criticized the majority's usurpation of legislative functions:' the Court justified
its actions by paying lip service to the concept of deferring to
legislative judgment if alternative remedies were provided. Since
there was "no explicit congressional dec1a;ation that persons injured . . . may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in
~ ~ Court rationalized that it could fill
the view of C ~ n g r e s s , "the
the gap created by Congress' silence by providing an implied
remedy.
In Davis, however, Congress had legislated in the area of
judicial relief for federal employees and arguably had concluded
that congressional employees could not recover money damages
from congressional employers. Bivens initiated a significant infringement by the judicial branch into the arena of policymaking; Davis furthered this encroachment by disregarding Congress' prior action in this area. As Justice Powell warned,
it would not be surprising for Congress to consider today's action unwarranted and to exercise its authority to reassert the
proper balance between the legislative and judicial branches. If
the reaction took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of federal
courts, the effect conceivably could be to frustrate the vindication of rights properly protected by the C o ~ r t . ' ~
89. 425 U.S. 820 (1976). This case held that a federal employee covered by Title VII
was required to follow the statutory administrative relief scheme set up under Title VII
as his exclusive remedy. The aggrieved employee was not permitted to bypass the procedures set up under Title VII by filing a Bivens-type action in federal court after he
missed a statutory deadline for judicial review.
90. 571 F.2d at 798 n.lO. The Civil Service Commission has the "authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this section [42 U.S.C. 2000e-161 through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay
. . " 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-16(b) (1976). The aggrieved federal employee may file a civil
action against the head of his or her department if he is dissatisfied with the actions
taken by the Commission. Id. 5 2000e-16(c) (1976).
91. 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id. a t 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
92. 403 U.S. at 397.
93. 442 U.S. a t 255 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).

..
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The potential for personal liability of members of Congress
in the future will undoubtedly motivate Congress to "reform" its
employment practices.@'However, it is unclear under Davis how
much leeway Congress will be allowed in structuring an alternative relief scheme. Davis implicitly reserved a judicial veto over
the legislature's right to choose the best alternative for protecting congressional employees. "[Wlere Congress to create equally
effective alternative remedies," the Court declared, "the need for
The Court's use of the
damages relief might be ~bviated."@~
qualifying word "might" indicates that the judicial branch will
evaluate the practicality or effectiveness of alternative remedies
created by Congress and will not merely defer to the judgment
of the legislat~re.~~
The Court probably felt that heightened judicial scrutiny of
congressionally-enacted alternative remedies was needed, because Congress could not be presumed to act fairly and objectively in providing alternative remedies for congressional employees. It is conceivable that an exception to the Brown rule of
limiting federal employees to alternative statutory relief schemes
mandated by Congress could be established for congressional
employees due to the Davis idea that Congress cannot deprive
its employees of their preexisting implied right to a damages
remedy by formulating other remedies. Congress may therefore
have difficulty creating a viable alternative to the personal liability of congressmen that was imposed by Davis.

C. A Confusing Distinction?
Justice Brennan's two-step analysis in Davis presents conceptual and practical difficulties. The focus of the first step of
the analysis is on the "nature of the right [plaintiff] asserts,"@'
which determines whether a cause of action will be implied to
protect that right. As for the second step, if the requested remedy effectuates the constitutional right being protected, then the
judiciary is qualified to grant that remedy.
94. For some suggestions on alternative means of protecting congressional employment rights, see Last Plantation, supra note 87, at 304-10 (1979).
95. 442 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
96. Professor Dellinger agreed with this proposition: "The ultimate determination of
whether a remedial scheme appropriately effectuates the mandate of the Constitution is,
of course, to be made by the Court as an exercise of constitutional judicial review." Dellinger, supra note 52, at 1548 n.89.
97. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18.
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In support of his analysis, Brennan asserted the unique proposition that "[a] plaintiff may have a cause of action even
though he be entitled to no relief at all."98 This statement, supportable for declaratory judgments, is of dubious validity for a
money damages remedy. Adjudicating a constitutionally-implied
claim when the money damages requested are not available is
tantamount to an advisory opinion on the merits of the claim.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure link the right to bring a
claim with the relief the claim is based upon; if the relief is unavailable, the cause of action it rests on must fail also.s9 Justice
Brennan's attempt to disregard the linkage between a cause of
action and its subsequent remedy only confuses the policy issues
involved with both.
Brennan's approach effectively narrows the scope of analysis
of constitutional causes of action and distorts the broad policy
analysis envisioned by Justice Harlan for these claims. The twostep analysis weights the scales in favor of plaintiffs with constitutional grievances, since narrowing the focus of analysis eliminates many potential stumbling blocks. However, while favoring
constitutional plaintiffs, this method of analysis fails to adequately justify allowing these plaintiffs to use the enforcement
powers of the courts.
Justice Powell was convinced that Brennan's zeal to protect
plaintiffs with constitutional grievances led him to ignore prudential factors that should have been weighed by the Court.
Courts must act responsibly if they seek to assume the traditional legislative responsibility of weighing policy factors and determining which parties are entitled to judicial protection.loOAccording to Powell, "weighting of relevant concerns," such as
comity and separation of powers, must be made before deciding
to infer a cause of action from the Constitution.lol The Davis
dissenters were disturbed by the assessment of a money damages remedy against a congressman, not by the nature of the
remedy itself. The two-step Davis analysis ignored the broad
policy implications of awarding such a remedy against a con98. Id.

99. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
100. Justice Powell protested that "the decision of the Court today . . . avoids our
obligation to take into account the range of policy and constitutional considerations that
we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining whether a particular remedy
should be enacted." 442 U.S.at 254-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 252-53.
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gressman, and the 'legitimate interests of Members of Congress"lo2in carefully avoiding the creation of a statutory cause of
action were not taken into account. The Brennan approach does
not allow for careful deliberation of all relevant policy factors
that should be considered in the constitutional cause of action
context.

IV. CONCLUSION
Davis v. Passman was the first definitive Supreme Court
ruling on the scope of the doctrine of implied constitutional
causes of action since the doctrine's origin in Biuens. Davis formulated a two-part analysis of the propriety of implying causes
of action from constitutional guarantees, separating the issues of
a cause of action and the remedy for the cause of action. Applying this analysis, the Court first declared its power to award a
cause of action to hear the merits of Davis's constitutional claim,
since there was no effective alternative means of enforcing the
asserted constitutional right. Secondly, the Court concluded that
the Constitution impliedly authorized the judiciary to award
money damages for plaintiffs in Davis' situation without express
congressional approval, as long as the circumstances were "appropriate" for granting the remedy.
The Davis analysis is troubling because it limits the consideration of policy factors to the nature of the constitutional guarantee asserted and the proper remedy to protect that interest.
The dissenters in Davis forcefully argued for a more broadlybased analysis of all the factors related to the implication of a
constitutional cause of action. Davis could be subject to congressional attack because it directly interferes with the independence of congressional decisionmaking.
Douglas M. Monson

102. Id. at 255.

